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Introduction.
The remedies under the early Roman Law.
Under the early English Law.
New York statute upon the subject.
Who may impeach the transfer?
Divisions of the subject .
1- Where fraudulent grantee is asking active inter-
ference of a court.
2- Vhere fraudulent grantee is on the defensive.
a-- Where he is guilty only of constructive
fraud.
b- Where, Jlthough guilty of actual fraud,
he is allowed reimbursements for payments
made subsequently to the fraudulent transfer
anF forming no part of it.
Conclusion.
The earliest remedies of creditors in a
crude legal system were always against the person
and not the property of the debtor. At Rome in ceri
tain cases, the debtor might, be oaken and sold into
slavery if he could not make the necessary arrange-
ments with his creditors for his ralease.
Finally, the remedies against the person were
taken away and a complete system for annulling fraud-
ulent transfers and securing the debtor's estate
for creditors -,-,as provided by the Digest of Justin-
ian.
The LJaw of England in early times, by allowing
imprisonment for debt in all cases, at the option of
the creditor, effectually operated as a threat against
the debtor's person to prevent fraudulenb transfers;
but its operation was neutralized to sorme extent at
an early stage of legal development by the protection
against the arrest of debtors in Sanctuaries.
Hence arose a spasmodic and premature crop of
fraudulent conveyances in England: This occasioned
the passage of the soatute l3th. of Elizabeth and
others.
By the recent abolishment of imprisonment
for debt, bho law no longer prevenus i±'awuuieno
conveyances; they have sprUng Lip around us in
frightful numbers b-yond all previous experience.
Modern law , accordingly, has presenued bo 1t
what -Lr.,. early law never had, the pressing problem
of how to neutiralize the fraudulenb transfers which
it has ceased to prevent,.
New York has been highly conservative in her
policy in this matter and one of uhe slowest to make
advances toward the invalidation of conveyances to
defraud creditors. The Statute of l;3th. hlizabetP
is the foundation of all the modern law of fraudulent
conveyances; and New York and uhe other various
states have passed statuTes which are substantially
the same as the English statute.
The provisionsof the New York statute are to
be found in the 8th ed. Rev. S tat. p. 25,92,and are
substantially as follows---
sec. l.--Emery conveyance or assignment in writing
or otherwise of any estate or interest in lands,
goods, or things in L&ction ....... made with intent
to hinder, delay or defraud creditors or other
persons of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures,
debts or demands ........ as againsu the persons so
hindered, delay 1 or defrauded, shall be void.
sec. 4.-- Th question of fraudulenb intenu
shall be deemed a question of facu and not of law; noi
shall any conveyance or- charge be adjudged fraudulenb
as against creditors or purchasers soiely on tihe
ground that it was not on a valuable consideration.
sec. 5.--- These provisions shall not be con-
strued in any manner to af 'lcc Of- impair the title
of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless
it shall appear that such purchaser had previous
notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate
grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title
of such grantor.
The principle upon which this legislation
is founded and toward which all the courts are work-
ing is that bhe entire property of which the debtor
is the real or beneficial owner constiutbes a fund
which is primarily applicable uo the fullest extenu
of ii)s enbire value To the paymenu of ius owner's
debts; and that value widll no-bbeallowed to be
withdrawn.from such primary pplicaion, if any legul
or equi.able giun.nd can bke found on wici io prevenu
such withdrawal .,
The idea in setting aside a transfer as
fraudulent is to .so place -,hfe properby that the
creditors will in no way be damaged by hhe transfei.:
it is not that -the creditors should gain by such
fraudulent transfer, or on the other hand that ihe
f,raudulent grantee should be punished: In obher
words, the position of the creditors in regard i,o
the debtor's property should be just as though there
never had been a transfer.
As a result of sec. .5 of bhe statute and
various decisions, we see that in bhe case of a
voluntary c onveyance ib is no, necessary bo pirove a
frauduleznt intent on the part of the grantee, buu
only to show intenb to defratd or circumsbances
which in law amount to such intenbion on -ohe part
-of the granb&r alone: this is because -he grantee is
not a purchaser for value. In cases of conveyances
for value, it, must be shown t4hat the granec
participated in tha intent of the grantor to hinder ,
delay or defraud the creditrs, and acted in furbherane-
of such intent. The tendency of he courts of his
state is to regard the debtor's property as a trust
fund for the benefit of his creditors and any
attempt to deplete this fund will be rendered inef-
fectual as far as possible without interfering with
the rights of third persons not parties uo the fraud.
Who may impeach the transfer?
The statute was designed solely to protect,
the rights of creditors,- and consequently it renders
a fraudulent transfer void only as against them,
and makes no provision whatever in regard to its
effect between the parties. A conspiracy to defraud
creditors is an offence against good morals, common
honesty and sound public policy; so therefore, it is
a proper case for the application of the maxim "In
pari delicto melior est conditio defendentiA.
nhe principle hat, such a contr act binds the
parties to it its a principle which comrmends itself
no loss to the moralist than to the jurisu6, for no
dictate of duty calls on the judge to exti-icate the
rogue from his own toils. On anj oiner principle,
a knave night gain but could not lose by a dishonest
expedient, and inducememts would be furnished to
unfair dealing if uhe courts were to repaii, the
accidents of an unsuccessful trick.
A fraudulent oransfer is good as against the
granbor, his heirs, executors, adminisbrators,
parties claiming under him and his vendees and gran-
tees. In facts, the title of a fraudulent grantee
is nou only as against ohe debbor, but it is also
good against all parties except creditors and their
represen-atives. It is voidable only at the suit
of creditors and if no creditor interposes and
complains, the transfer is as binding and effectuai
to pass the bible as if made with bhe best, of intents
and for the most innocent and commendable purposes.
But not only must, a person be a creditor in order
to put in controversy the bona fides of a sale of
goods, but the character in which the attacking party
prosecutes the action and claims to overthrow bhe
sale or conveyance must be settled and put ut rest,
by a judgment ot decree of a. competent court.
The same principles of policy which require
that a fraudulent u ransfer shall be held valid as
betweon the parties also demunc. that no aid or relief
shall be granted for the enforcement of any agreement
arising out of a fraudulent transaction. The sup-
pression of fraud is far more likely in general to
be accomplished by leaving the parties without remedy
against each other.
In discussing the question as to what
amounts the fraudulent grantee is entitled to upon
a conveyance being set aside as fraudulent, we shall,
for the sake of convenienceconsider the subject,
dividing it into the following classes, which although
we have nowhere'seen the division so made, yet) we
think vwill be consistent with all of the decisions
upon the subject. We will consider
1st.- Where the fraudulent grantee is asking
for the active interference of some court for his
protection, or for his reimbursement for improvements,
or for moneys paid in pursuance ef the fraudulent
arrangement, or to discharge incwnbrances; and
2d.- Where the fraudulent grantee is upon
the defensive in an action against him by ifhe
creditors of bhe grantor for the rents, profits etc.
This class will be properly subdivided hereafter.
As to the first class of cases, the rule of
law is well established by the courts that a grantee
of real or personal estate, when it ig shown thau
the purchase was made with intent to defraud, or
hinder and delay the creditors of the grantor, has
no equity as against such creditors to be protectods
for the amoun-o he actually paid on such purchase.
The theory upon which the courts base their deci-
sions in this class of cases\is the aplication of
that fundamental maxim in equity that 'He who comes
into equity must come with clean hands", or as som-
times stated "He that has coinmited iniquity shall
not have equity".
The law ,"ill not allow the transfer to stand as
sCcurity for ,he amount paid to the grantor(a):
or for sums subsequently paid to creditors(b):
-0--oo-o-o-0-0-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o--0-0-0-0-0-0-°-°-°"
(a) Sands v Codwise 4 John. 536.
Allen v Berry 50 Mo. 90.
Fullerton v Viall 42How. Pr.2P4.
Davis v Leopold 87 N.Y. 620.
(b) Wood v Hunt 38 Barb. 302.
Union Nat'i B'nk. v Warner 12 Hun 306.
Even toh he thetby pays off a mortgage(a):
The reason and justice of this rule, is well stated
in FerVuson vHillmart(b) " If the fraudulent grantee
could be ,rotecte,. for bhe amount actually paid by
him at the time of bhe fraudulenb bitnsfer, then
a person could make a sale of his property with intent
to avoid the paymeno of hid debts, take the money
and leave the country and the purchaser have knowledge
that he intended to do so and yet be protected for
money so paid; A rule which would lead to such
results cannot be tolerated by thei courbs".
Chancellor Kent in an early case very well stated
the rule "A fraudulent conveyance is no conveyance
as against the interest to be defrauded: this is bhe
plain language and inuelligent sense of The common
law: it is impossible that the deeds can be permitted
to stand as securi-y if they are to be adjudged
void ab init)io: if they have no legal existence,
-0--0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-- o-o-o----O-0-00-- 0-0--
(a) R.R. Co.v Soutter 13 iali. bl..
Thompson v Bickford 19 Minn. 17.
(b) Fer ,uson v Hillman 5b Wis. 1,0.
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it would be inconsistent and absurd to recognize them
for anj lawful purpose: There is no instance to be
met with of any reimbursemeni or indemniuy afforded
bi a court of chancery -o a particeps criminis in a
case of actual fraud."
Fullerton v Viall 42 How. Pr. 294, was a case of
this kind. The def't. had taken aconveyance of realty
upon which there was a mortgage of $800, agreeing to
pay in addition $1000, $bOO being a debt due from
the grantor to the grantee and bOO was paid in
cash. In an action to set aside the conveyance,
the recovry was not limited to the amounb received
by ohe fraudulent grantee on the sale, but his
liability was held to extend to the value of the
property received by him and whici he had put beyond
the reach of the creditors of his fraudulent g;rantov.
subj ect only to prior valid inctunbrances. He was
neither allowed credit for his own debt of $bOO
which constituted a part of -he consideration he gave
for tha same, nor for the $5OO he paid to his grantor
in cash.
II.
At first thought, this rule mif hb seem
to work harshness anct injustice to he granuee, but
if ths rule were otherwise, it would foster Such
transactions and encourage parties to enter into
them. A fraudulen- grantee would have everything
to gain and nothing to lose; because if uhe Tran-
saction was impeached, he would be in no worse a
position than he was before, while if its validity
was unquestioned he would be in a much better position
than otherwise. If the grantee in such a case
suffers hardship, it is but justly; fo~l.though the
refusal of the law to allow such grantee credit for
moneys paid is nou based on tuhe right of a court of
equity to punish the party for his wrongdoing,
nevertheless if the party does by the decision of the
court suffer punishment, it is but just; and it is
not the province of the court to interfere.
In every such case, the party bargaining with the
debtor with such an intent does it ab the peril of
having that which h- receives taken away from him by
the creditors of the debtor whom he is attempting
to defraud, without having any remedy to recover
what he parts with in carrying oub the bargain. The
lawill leave him in the snare of his own devises.
12.
In R. R. Co. v Soutuer, 13 Wall. 517, a railroad
belonging co an incorporated company and then under
a 1st and 2d. mortgage was sold on execution and
bought in by certain bond holders whom the 2d o
junior mortgage was given tb secure.These purchasers
organized themselves into a now corporation and worked
the road themaelves. After a certain time , the
mortgagees under the first or senior mortgage pressed
their debt to a degree of foreclosure; and then to
prevent a sale of the road, the new corporation
paid the mortgage debt. Subsequently to this, and on
a creditors bill, the sale made to the creditors
under the 2d. mortgage was set aside as fraudulen6
and void as against other creditors of bhe original
corporation. Held in an opinion by J. Bradley, with
three Judges dissenting, that no bill in equity
would lie for a recovery of tuhe amounu so paid in
satisfying such ist. mortgage. By satisfying the
creditors, they could have kept bhe property and their
title would have been good as against the whole
world. "The payment was not made under a mistake
of fact, for if it was made under any mistake at all
13.
it was clearly a mistake of law: They mistook the
legal effect of transactions of which they were
chargeable with notice: they had full and actual
notice of all uhe transactions and all the evidence
on which the decree was ultimately founded.
This principle is extended to uhe case of assign-
ments, and in a case where an assignment wa et aside
as fraudulent(a), the assignee being a party to
the fraud, the assignee was not allowed upon accoun-
ting for an; disbursements made by him, and was charged
with the costs and expenses of accounting. In that
case, the assignee had paid over ,4Ceoo to a creditor
in pursuance of a preference in the assignment for
that amount: the assignment, being void ab initio,
could afford no protection whatever to the assignee
who under color of its authority interfered with the
property and assets of the assignor: It was the
same for all legal purposes as if it had never been
exe cut ed •
Now, since the fraudulenb grantee in poss-
ession of the property cannot be protected for bhe
money or other consideration he may have given for the
transfer as against the creditors of such debtor,
it would seem to follow as a nece3sary conseqgence
that such grantee cannot be protecued in uhe possess-
ion of the proceeds of such property received by
him on a &ale thereof. The property in the hands
of a fivaudulent purchaser is held by him in tLiusb fOi'
the creditors of his fraudulent vendor, and so when
the property is converted into money, the money -.s
impressed with the same trusb. The originll? con-
veyance being void as 6o creditors, no title as to
them ever passed to.. the gi'antee; and if he sells it
and receives the money, he muust hold the money for
the benefit of thl creditors. In equity, such money
in the hands of the fraudulent grantee is held for
the benefit of creditors.
Coming to the next class of cases, we find
a distinctly different class. Instead of asking
the active interference of a court, the grantee is
upon the defensive in an a.ction agai;st h.im asking
the setting aside of a conveyance as fraudulent.
14.
15.
And firli, 1,t, us caicei t~he case where ,he
,ranflCo, is onl{ uii,,y of GorLtpuctLve ti' ucL, and does
not, participat! in -he Lctua fiLuduient inteno
of the grartor. The cases hold , hau where a dced
is soct1'ht to be set aside as fraudcuient against
crediuors, and there is nob sufficienc, evidence of
fraud to induce heI court -co avoid it, absolutbelj,
but suspicious ci rcU 'wtance as to ,h - adaquacy of.
the considerutdjon and faionoss of he transaction,
the court) will notu set aside the conveyance altogetrter,
but permit ib to stand as security for the sum acTuali,
advanced(a). Chancello.- Kent in Boyd v DuntLp
(a) says "There is a marked difference between an
interference actively to compel a parby to Peconvey
or surrender a deed, and a refusal to aid U pb-ruy
who seeks a specific performance of c eonbiracb.
Tf actual fraud be not, clearly and satisfactoi'i1,/
madc" out, the courtG may refuse it.s aid, bu-U will
-- 0.-0.- -o, -0-e-o-0-0 -o -o-0e-0-0e-0e-0-0o-o-0o-0o-o-0-0o-0 
-
(a) Boyd v Dunlap I John. Ch. 476.
Bigelow v Ayrault, 46 Barb. 143.
16.
not take so decisive a step as setting aside in toto
the atmsticd title". in the case cited, the inad-
equacy of the puice was quite considerable, and the
Chancellor said that to allow the dded to stand
as security only for the true sum due would be dolng
justice to the parties and granting a relief which
could not be afforded by a court of law.
The next class of cases is where the grantee
has paid out moneys for taxes, necessary repairs
and improvements subsequent to the fraudulent
transaction and not s a part of the transaction,
but independent and distinct from it.
In such cases, the courts have held that where
a conveyance is set aside as fraudulent as t6 the
grantor's creditors, the grantee on accounting for
the rents and profits, is entitled for credit for
taxes pai by him, anr repairs tade which were
necessary for the p)ese"'Wion f the property and to
keep it tenantable, and for irterest paid on mortgages
which were valid liens on the property though he was a
guilty participant in the fraud
VanKorl v Fonda 5 John. Ch. 38S.
KinZ v Wilcox 11 Paige Ch. 589.
17.
Loo V Vilkinson 113 N. Y. 485.
Hamilton Nat'l B'nk. v Halstead 134 N. Y.
In Kin v o, the owner of some property subject
to two mortgages conveyed it to h~s brother-in-law
for-.the 'purpose of defrauding his creditors: the
grantee took possession, received rents and profits,
and made some improvements thereon, and subsequently
paid and took a,, assignment of the mortgages: It was
held that in setting aside the conveyance as fraudulent,
dAd in taking an account of the rents and ptofits
received by the fraudulent grantee, he was to be creditea
withtheamont pon the mortgages and the value of
with the amount, uo thC:1gae n hevleo
the improvements made by him upon the premises.
This seems to us to be a very just and equit-
able rule. It is the general rule, even in actions to
recover daiages for pure torts that the plaintiff
shall recover compensation for such damage only as he
has suffered, and s'dch is the invariable rule in such c(iUes
except where, by the settled rule of law, punitive
daTages may be alvarded, and in such cases, the courts
are constantly striving to come nearer to the rule of
compensation, leaving the wrong-doer to the crimm-nal
courts for punishment. And why is
18.
this not right, ' 'd jusb? A court, of etui ky (ioes not,
sit, for the punisJhem D of cririirmals. if a fraudulen,,
grantee has violated the crim.nal law, he may be
prosecuted and punisted in the criminal bourts.
While such a grantee will not be allowe. for
permanent improvement,,s mtk(ie upon bile §ant ed
pi oper;y to suit, his fancy, or simply to promote
)is interests, when Uhe creditors of the grantor
come into a court, of equity seeking-oo compel hiri
to account for rents ano profits, the accoun-ting
should be had upon equitable principles; and when he
has been compelled to surrender the property conveyed
to him and to acconmt, for all the profits he has
made or oughb to have made, the ends of justice
have been attained.
One of -- L- la-es, and most important cases
of this kind is Loos v iilkinson, 113 N. Y.485.
In that case the def't. Vilkinson was an active
participanu in the fraud and in 6he acbion against
him by his grantor's crediors to have the convey-
ance set aside, it was held thmi he shoulct account,
for the rents received from tuhe real estate during
the time hfi had occupie, ii,; but -ola-t he should be
19.
credited with the amounb paid by him during the
same, peiiod for necessar,-j repair-s on the premises
'ith tihe anMouno paid for taxes -'Jije e occupie(
them, wiuh interes-u on ,hA mortgages upon the
premi ses. In reference -o The repairs, it, was
found that they were necessary foi- the preservation
of the property: They were not made in pursuance of,
or to carry out the fraudulent scheme, or to
gratify the caprice of the def't., but were necessary
to preserve the property for ihe creditors, and
make the rents for wh ic he is accountable.
Why, then, should he not be allowed for such
expenses? No harm o1 prejudice is cuus- d tne
creditors by such allowance.
As to the taxes, they were imposed by supreme
auth~rity for the benefit of the public an were
inevitable. if the credi-ord had taken the proper-y
at the time the def't. did, they would have been
obliged -o pay them: by the paym ent of 6hem he did
them no wrong and caused ,hem no prejudice.
As to the payment of bhe interest on -uhe mort-
gages, the sate could be said: they were liens which
had to be paid and the payment, was made fori the
20.
benefit of the creditors and in their inuerest:
it had no connection whabeve, with ,he ftlauuilent
scheme and it, is impossible to see upon what prin-
c- 1d.es of ,-ustice or equity an allowance for such
payrmen, could be irefused.
Allowance was also made for' the expenses of col-
lecting, the rents.
The claim for money paid for insurance however
was refused: that benefited no one; it was not
an insurence for The benefit of creditol-s, but solely
for the benefi.-t of ctf't., ana if bIc property fl.d
burned down, they could nob hayv, enfor'ced it in
their favor. It was only jus- tiau he shoulo be
credited with such &rITount.
Aboub the lates6 case in this sate upon
this subject is Hamilton Nat'l. B'nk v Halstead,
134 N.Y. b20. In that case, fn. h.Halstead. Tas
the owner of certain securities which fhe hypobuhecated
with a Trus-, Co. for a loan of $iolb(00.
F'ruidulen-ly and withoub aIctual consid(L.ation,
he transferred them to his son, the def't., and
thereupon the son gave his check for $65000 which was
endorsed by the father and taken by the son who with
it paid the aMount of the loan. The son afterwards
realizedC upon tIe Securities $76?boo.
The question wus whether the son was liable for,
the whole amount, $76500, or for only the surplus
of ,l1.5oo. The plaintiffs urged bhat the
judgment should be fot the whole amount, tita having
been a party to the fraud, a cour- of equity should
chargene him with -uhe full value of thc- s-ock, not-
wit(hstanding the larger poIrtbLon of it was required
to pay a valid debt, whicn it, had beon plcdged -o
se-cure, prior to thF transfer to a party in no wise
connected with the fraud. But bhe court hi'ld that
as the paymen- of the $d'bO00 loan by the son was
entirely independent of thc fraudulent, transaction,
the plaintiff could not recover the amount so paid..
And it seems to us that such recovery was justly
refused, for by the payment of such sum the piaintifs
were in no wise harmed: practically, the father
only had an interest in the securities to an amount
22.
equal to the difference between the value of -hef se-
curitie s and 0he LkMOunu fov which tAey we e pieAged,
P6bOOO; an'l1 had the transfer never been made, he
creditzors of i. Haistead could only have re&ched
th" securitjes subject o this lien which ujheY would
have been obliped to puy bhemsplves.
Parker, J. in his decision says: ult is true
that cases abound where Lhe COLts , in an action *o
set aside fraudulent conveyances, have refused o0
allow the fraudulent , grantee to be re-
imbursed foir money actuallj paid as a consideration
for the conveyance, and in the course of the dis-
cussion have oreated the refusal of the courb to
allow such reimbursements as a proper punishment
for the fraud 'A it has never been assumed, as far as
we have observed, that refusal was based on the righT,
of a couruc of equity to punish uhe party because
of his ,-,ronjdoing. The effect of the decisions may
have been to punish quite severely bhe fraudulent
grantee, but bhe courts did nob have the power bo
deprive him of one dollar because they deemed him
deserving of punishmnent".
23.
In hne Ao f an- p'i-lps unsatis-L-ctory dis-
cussion, ve hive strove merely to discover the under-
-1,-J -j iTc i-lec y'ovmnnii% the situation, citing cases
an- enrd.vorin-.to stete the law as it exists at the
lrrsent time iu the state of NeVT York. We have not
boon so 3.ssVIlns as to J.dvanco any or± i nal theories
in tespect to the matter;nor have we undertaken to
criticise the decisions of the judges in the various
cases: we have simply taken the law as vie found it
ant, h~ve tried to show the tendency of the courts to
plaue the parties in the same position had no transfer
been made. They aim, not to purmish a fraudulent
grntee for any part he may have taken in the transac-
tion, nor, on the other hand, to allow him to reap
any benefit from his own wrong.

